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THE COSTS OF REGULATORY REDUNDANCY:  
CONSUMER PROTECTION OVERSIGHT OF ONLINE TRAVEL 
AGENTS AND THE ADVANTAGES OF SOLE FTC JURISDICTION 
James C. Cooper* 
Every administration in recent history has attempted to reduce 
regulatory redundancies. One area of regulatory redundancy that 
deserves attention is the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) and 
Department of Transportation’s (DOT) consumer protection 
authority over online travel agents (OTAs), which generated $111 
billion in revenue in 2013. This regulatory redundancy guarantees 
that two agencies will oversee OTAs, prevents harmonization of 
online consumer protection policy, and is likely to impose 
unnecessary costs on OTAs to adhere to two separate regulatory 
regimes. The importance of this conflict will grow as privacy and 
data security become preeminent consumer protection issues and 
DOT expands its jurisdiction to online information providers. 
Efficiency suggests the FTC as the sole consumer protection 
overseer of OTAs. Only the FTC has the current capacity to 
regulate all OTA activities, and it enjoys unrivaled expertise with 
respect to e-commerce consumer protection. Further, in contrast 
with the FTC’s ex post enforcement approach, which focuses on 
actual or likely consumer harm, DOT’s ex ante regulatory 
approach is ill-suited for the fast moving world of e-commerce. 
Finally, the FTC faces more serious internal and external 
constraints on its enforcement authority, which tends to temper the 
potential for regulatory overreach. There are several possible 
ways to effect this regulatory reform, ranging from the complete 
abolition of DOT’s aviation consumer protection authority and the 
FTC Act’s common carrier exemption, to a memorandum of 
understanding between FTC and DOT that harmonizes policy. 
                                                
 * George Mason University School of Law, Director of Research & Policy, Law 
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180 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 17: 179 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
I. 	   	  INTRODUCTION ....................................................................181	  
II.	   DOT & FTC CONSUMER PROTECTION AUTHORITY ........185	  
A.	   The DOT’s Role ............................................................185	  
B.	   The FTC’s Role .............................................................188	  
C.	   Concurrent FTC-DOT Consumer Protection Jurisdiction 
Over OTAs ....................................................................190	  
III.	   THE COSTS OF REGULATORY REDUNDANCY ....................193	  
A.	   Government Inefficiencies Due to Duplication of Effort 
and Coordination Costs ................................................193	  
B.	   Industry Costs From Compliance with Multiple and 
Inconsistent Regulatory Regimes ..................................195	  
IV.	   THE CASE FOR THE FTC ....................................................196	  
A. 	  Scope Economies in Enforcement .................................197	  
B.	   Institutional Competence ..............................................198	  
C.	   Flexibility from Ex-Post, Harm-Based Enforcement ....204	  
D.	   External and Internal Constraints ................................211	  
1.	   Judicial Review .......................................................211	  
2.	   Internal Procedures ................................................214	  
3.	   Regulatory Capture ................................................216	  
V.	   POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS ..........................................................216	  
VI.	  	  	  CONCLUSION .......................................................................219	  
 
  
DEC. 2015] Regulatory Redundancy 181 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Every administration in recent history has attempted to reform 
the inevitable overlaps and redundancies that arise from an ever-
growing federal bureaucracy. President Reagan established the 
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) to 
“minimize duplication and conflicts of regulations.” 1  Al Gore 
famously headed President Clinton’s “Reinventing Government” 
initiative, which strove to streamline government functioning and 
ultimately recommended consolidation or elimination of several 
agencies.2 Most recently, President Obama issued an executive 
order in an attempt to ameliorate the problem of “redundant, 
inconsistent, or overlapping” regulatory requirements and assigned 
his OIRA chief, Cass Sunstein, the task of pruning the regulatory 
thicket. 3  There are myriad examples of agencies that have 
regulatory responsibility over the same area. For example, the 
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the Department of Justice 
(“DOJ”) share responsibility for enforcing the antitrust laws; the 
Federal Reserve, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(“CFPB”), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Company (“FDIC”) 
share regulatory authority over banks; the Food & Drug 
Administration (“FDA”) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(“USDA”) share regulatory authority over food safety.4 Indeed, 
President Obama quipped in his 2011 State of the Union address 
announcing his proposal to reduce regulatory inefficiencies, “[t]he 
Interior Department is in charge of salmon while they’re in fresh 
water, but the Commerce Department handles them when they’re 
                                                
 1 Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 C.F.R. 51,735(2)(b) (1993). 
 2 See AL GORE, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT 
THAT WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
REVIEW (1993). 
 3 Exec. Order No. 1356376, 76 C.F.R. 3821 (2011). 
 4 See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory 
Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1146–50 (2012) (listing areas of overlapping 
jurisdiction); Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 
187 (2011) (listing areas of overlapping jurisdiction). See also GAO,-11-318SP, 
OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE POSSIBLE DUPLICATION IN GOVERNMENT 
PROGRAMS, SAVE TAX DOLLARS, AND ENHANCE REVENUES (2011) (finding 
thirty-four areas of regulatory redundancy that could be consolidated). 
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in saltwater. I hear it gets even more complicated once they’re 
smoked.”5 
One area of regulatory redundancy that deserves attention is 
the FTC’s and Department of Transportation’s (“DOT”) consumer 
protection authority over online travel agents (“OTAs”), such as 
Travelocity, Expedia, and Orbitz. The FTC enforces Section 5 of 
the FTC Act, which broadly prohibits “unfair and deceptive acts or 
practices.”6 With the exception of some carve-outs, Section 5 gives 
the FTC jurisdiction over almost all of the Internet economy.7 
Although the FTC is barred by statute from regulating airlines 
directly, it has asserted jurisdiction over OTAs. DOT also has 
consumer protection authority under Section 411 of the Airline 
Deregulation Act (“ADA”), which was modeled after the FTC Act 
but limits its jurisdiction to air carriers and the sale of air 
transportation by “ticket agents.”8 Because OTAs are considered 
ticket agents, FTC and DOT have concurrent jurisdiction over 
OTAs’ sales of airline tickets. Although the FTC essentially has 
abdicated responsibility over OTAs’ airline ticket sales to DOT, 
two forces threaten to bring this dormant conflict to life. First, as 
privacy and data security have become the preeminent consumer 
protection concern,9 it seems unlikely that the FTC—the national 
privacy and data security cop— would be so quick to abdicate its 
jurisdiction over OTAs in the event of a data breach or some other 
privacy concern that may arise in connection with OTAs’ massive 
collection of consumer data. Second, DOT recently has attempted 
to expand its definition of “ticket agents” to cover entities that only 
                                                
 5 President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 5, 2011). 
 6 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
 7  The Procrustean Problem With Prescriptive Regulation, Remarks of 
Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Comm’r, U.S. Federal Trade Comm’n (2014), 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/291361/140318fsf
.pdf. 
 8 49 U.S.C. § 41712 (2010). 
 9 See Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address Before the 
USCIB/BIAC/OECD Conference, One Year Later: Privacy and Data Security 
in a World of Big and Data, THE INTERNET OF THINGS, AND GLOBAL DATA 
FLOWS, 1 (March 10, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ 
public_statements/629691/150310uscibremarks.pdf. 
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provide information about airline fares, such as Google or Trip 
Advisor.10 Online advertising, however, is squarely in the FTC’s 
bailiwick. 
This regulatory redundancy is bad government. It guarantees 
that two agencies will oversee OTAs—DOT for air travel sales, 
and FTC for hotels and rental cars—when one agency could do the 
job more efficiently. Further, it prevents harmonization of online 
consumer protection policy. The FTC has been the leader in 
addressing consumer protection in e-commerce. Not only is such 
regulatory redundancy wasteful for taxpayers, it threatens to 
impose serious costs on one of the largest Internet businesses and 
ultimately the consumers. The online travel industry is a key driver 
of e-commerce growth, earning $111 billion in 2013, which 
amounts to one-third of all e-commerce revenue.11 Almost half of 
travel is booked online, with OTAs responsible for about a quarter 
of this revenue.12 Having one set of rules for online sales of airline 
tickets and another for the rest of the Internet also is likely to 
impose unnecessary costs on this important sector associated with 
adherence to two separate regulatory regimes. 
Avoiding this potential regulatory conflict suggests a fix that 
selects one agency to provide consumer protection oversight of 
OTAs. The FTC is the clear choice. First, and perhaps most 
obviously, only the FTC has the current capacity to regulate all 
OTA activities, rather than merely the portion that deals with 
airlines. Second, as the primary federal consumer protection 
enforcer for over seventy years, the FTC enjoys unrivaled 
expertise, especially with respect to e-commerce. 13  Further, 
                                                
 10 See infra Part II.A. 
 11 According to Phocuswright, consumers purchased $132 billion worth of 
travel online in 2013, compared with $262 billion for the remainder of e-
commerce revenue in 2013. See Phocuswright, U.S. Online Travel Overview, 
Figure 1.11 (2014). 
 12 See Phocuswright, U.S. Online Travel Overview, Figures 1.11, 1.19 (2013) 
(43% of travel is booked online). 
 13 In 1938, the Wheeler-Lea Amendments to the FTC Act gave the FTC its 
consumer protection power over “unfair and deceptive acts and practices.” See 	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complementing its experience in the field, the FTC additionally 
enjoys a research capability—approximately eighty Ph.D. 
economists and a long and distinguished history of producing first-
rate public policy research14—that DOT lacks, and which has 
served it well in identifying potential harms and crafting policy. 
Third, DOT’s heavy-handed ex ante regulatory approach is ill-
suited for the fast moving world of e-commerce; FTC’s ex post 
enforcement approach, which focuses on actual or likely consumer 
harm, is far more nimble and likely to allow innovation to flourish. 
Finally, the FTC faces more serious internal and external 
constraints on its enforcement authority, which tends to produce 
consensus-based action and tempers the potential for regulatory 
overreach. 
There are several possible ways to effect this regulatory 
reform, ranging from the complete abolition of DOT’s aviation 
consumer protection authority and the FTC Act’s common carrier 
exemption, to a memorandum of understanding between FTC and 
DOT, under which DOT will agree to defer to FTC’s consumer 
protection authority over OTAs. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Part II provides background on 
both FTC and DOT consumer protection authority. Part III 
explains the costs of redundant regulatory oversight in this area, 
including its impact on “good government” and industry 
efficiency. Part IV makes the case for vesting the FTC with sole 
consumer protection authority over OTAs, and Part V sketches out 
possible means for effecting this reform. The final Part concludes 
the paper. 
                                                                                                         
Section Wheeler-Lea Amendments of 1938, § 1, Pub. L. No. 75-447, 52. Stat. 
111, 111 (1938). 
 14  See FTC Bureau of Economics, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-
offices/bureau-economics; Joshua D. Wright, How to Regulate the Internet of 
Things Without Harming its Future: Some Do’s and Don’ts, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, 16–18 (May 21, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ 
public_statements/644381/150521iotchamber.pdf. 
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II. DOT & FTC CONSUMER PROTECTION AUTHORITY 
DOT and FTC consumer protection authorities have very 
different origins. The DOT is an industry-specific regulator, whose 
consumer protection jurisdiction over airlines and, by extension, 
ticket agents, is an artifact of airline deregulation. The FTC, on the 
other hand, was created over a century ago with a broad mandate 
to be the nation’s consumer protection authority. Further, these 
agencies exercise their mandates in completely different manners. 
The DOT, especially in recent years, has chosen to promulgate 
rules that lay out required conduct for airlines and ticket agents. On 
the other hand, since the 1980s, the FTC has exercised its 
consumer protection authority through enforcement against 
practices that give rise to consumer harm. 
A. The DOT’s Role 
In 1978, the ADA freed commercial aviation from government 
control of rates and routes. 15  Prior to the ADA, the Civil 
Aeronautics Board (“CAB”) regulated all aspects of commercial 
air transportation, including rates and entry.16 After the CAB was 
dissolved in 1985, Congress transferred its consumer protection 
authority over air travel to DOT.17 Specifically, the ADA provided 
DOT the authority to “investigate and decide whether an air 
carrier, foreign air carrier or ticket agent has been or is engaged in 
an unfair or deceptive practice or an unfair method of competition 
in air transportation or the sale of air transportation.”18 Importantly, 
Congress modeled this provision after Section 5 of the FTC Act, 
and DOT has looked to FTC Act precedent to decide whether an 
                                                
 15 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 95959592 Stat. 1705 
(1978). 
 16 This regulation was designed largely to guarantee “reasonable” level of 
profitability for airlines. See VISCUSI, HARRINGTON, AND VERNON, THE 
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 612–13 (4th ed. 2005) [hereinafter 
Viscusi et al.]. 
 17 This decision was in large part due to the FTC’s lack of common carrier 
jurisdiction. See H.R. 2862, 114th Cong. (2015). 
 18 49 U.S.C. § 41712. The Aviation Consumer Protection Bureau carries out 
these consumer protection provisions. 
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act is unfair or deceptive.19 The ADA further defines a ticket agent 
as, “a person . . . that as a principal or agent sells, offers for sale, 
negotiates for, or holds itself out as selling, providing, or arranging 
for, air transportation.”20 The DOT mandate allows it to adopt 
regulations and to proceed with enforcement against entities within 
its jurisdiction that are engaged in unfair or deceptive acts.21 It can 
obtain both injunctive relief and civil penalties for violating rules.22 
In recent years, DOT has exercised its consumer protection 
authority through rulemaking, which mandates and proscribes 
certain conduct for airlines and ticket agents.23 In 2009, DOT 
finished a two-year rulemaking process by promulgating its 
Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections (“EAPP-I”) rule. 24 
Among other things, this rule requires air carriers to adopt and 
publish tarmac delay contingency plans and customer service 
plans, publish flight delay information, and it deems “continued 
delays on a flight that is chronically late” to be an unfair and 
deceptive practice.25 DOT quickly followed with EAPP-II, which 
requires airlines and ticket agents (including OTAs) to display the 
                                                
 19 See Cong. Rep. at 2860 (Section 411 “Duplicates the Authority which the 
Federal Trade Commission has to protect consumers in other industries under 
Section 5 of the FTC Act.”). 
 20 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(45) (2012). 
 21 49 U.S.C. § 41712 (2010). 
 22 See 49 U.S.C. § 41712(a) (2010) (injunctive relief); 49 U.S.C. § 46301 
(2014) (civil penalties). 
 23 Since the beginning of 2012, only two out of fifty-one DOT aviation 
consumer protection cases were not based on regulatory rule violations. DEP’T 
OF TRANSP., Consent Order, Lufthansa German Airlines, No. 2015-0002 (Jan. 
22, 2015); \DEP’T OF TRANSP., Consent Order, Aviation Services, Ltd., No. 
2012-0002 (Jan 27, 2012). Forty-five of these cases included violations of the 
Full Fare Advertising Rule; see also Joanne W. Young & Lyndsey M. 
Grunewald, Supreme Court Review of DOT Actions: An Opportunity to 
Discipline Government Efforts to Re-Regulate the Industry, 25 AIR & SPACE 
LAWYER 11, 15 (2013) (more recent DOT consumer protection rulemaking has 
not followed the “restrained approach” that considers “compelling evidence of 
consumer deception”). 
 24 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,983 (Dec. 20, 
2009). 
 25 Id. 
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fare inclusive of all government fees and taxes.26 The rule also 
requires air carriers to allow consumers to cancel their tickets 
(purchased at least two-weeks prior to travel) within 24 hours 
without penalty.27 DOT justified both rules as an effort to remedy 
unfair or deceptive practices, and the D.C. Circuit recently upheld 
them as a reasonable exercise of DOT’s authority.28 
Last year, DOT proposed a new set of regulations that would 
go further than the EAPP rules.29 Notably, the proposed rule would 
expand customer service obligations to ticket agents, 30  require 
large ticket agents to maintain a public list of the carriers whose 
tickets they sell, and prohibit “display biases” by mandating the 
order in which customer-facing search flight search products 
display results.31 Importantly, this proposal also would “clarify” 
DOT’s increasingly broad definition of “ticket agents” to include 
websites that provide search tools for flight information, but do not 
themselves sell air transportation.32 As a practical matter, this rule 
                                                
 26 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,110 (Apr. 25, 
2011). This full-fare advertising rule is a reversal of its policy in place since 
1984, which allowed prices to exclude per capita taxes and fees as long as they 
were displayed prominently. See Edward W. Sauer & Carlos P. Martins, 
Regulation of Airfare Advertising in the United States and Canada, 25 AIR & 
SPACE LAWYER 17, 18 (2012). 
 27 Id. 
 28 See Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 687 F.3d 403 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
Spirit Airlines also lost a challenge to the EAPP under the First Amendment. 
 29 Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection 
Issues, 79 Fed. Reg. 29,970 (NPRM May 23, 2014). 
 30 Specifically, it would require large ticket agents to provide prompt refunds 
when they are due; provide an option to hold a reservation at the quoted price 
without payment for 24 hours; disclose cancellation policies, and lavatory and 
seating configurations; notify customers of itinerary changes in a timely manner; 
and respond promptly to customer complaints. Conservation Stewardship 
Program Interim Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 29,982–86. 
 31 Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection 
Issues, 79 Fed. Reg. 29,970, 29,971. 
 32 Sites like Google and Kayak merely provide links to sites that actually sell 
transportation. The proposal is designed “to make clear that all entities involved 
in the sale or distribution of air transportation, including those intermediaries 
that do not themselves sell air transportation and receive compensation in 
connection with the sale of air transportation, are ticket agents subject to 	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would bring online sites like Google, Trip Advisor, and Kayak 
under DOT’s consumer protection jurisdiction as “ticket agents.”33 
This would mean that they would be subject to DOT’s fare display 
requirements, and would be required to show baggage fees and 
code share operations. Further, these search entities would be 
subject to DOT’s proposed prohibition on “display bias.” 
B. The FTC’s Role 
Congress gave the FTC authority to take action against “unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” 34 
Although the FTC once engaged in a host of industry rulemakings 
under its consumer protection authority, regulatory overreaches of 
the 1960s and 1970s—and the concomitant political backlash— 
led the FTC to adopt a harm-based approach that instead relies on 
adjudication.35 
Buoyed by the Supreme Court’s approval of an expansive 
authority under Section 5, the D.C. Circuit’s approval of the FTC’s 
ability to promulgate trade regulations rules under its consumer 
protection authority,36 and empowered by the 1975 Magnuson-
Moss Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act,37 the FTC 
embarked on a flurry of rulemakings in the 1970s that nearly led to 
                                                                                                         
[DOT’s] regulations regarding the display of airfare information.” Transparency 
of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection Issues, 79 Fed. Reg. 
29,970, 29,973. 
 33  See, e.g., Comments of Google, Inc. et al., Transparency of Airline 
Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection Issues, No. DOT-OST-2014-
0056 (Sept. 19, 2014). 
 34 Congress added the prohibition on “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” as 
part of the Wheeler-Lea Amendments in 1938. Wheeler-Lea Amendments of 
1938, § 1, Pub. L. No. 75-447, 52. Stat. 111, 111 (1938). This provision has 
been interpreted to form the basis of the Commission’s consumer protection 
authority. See Fed. Trade Comm’n. Policy Statement of Unfairness, appended to 
In re International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm. 
 35 See William MacLeod et al., Three Rules and a Constitution, 72 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 943 (2005). 
 36  See FTC v. Sperry-Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972); National 
Petroleum Refiners v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 37 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–12. 
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its demise. The proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back was 
the proposed children’s advertising rule, which would have barred 
not only all advertising to young children and the advertising of 
sugary foods to older children, but also required public service 
announcements to promote health.38 This ill-fated effort earned the 
FTC the moniker “the national nanny” 39  and resulted in 
congressional action limiting the Commission’s ability to use its 
unfairness authority to promulgate advertising regulations.40 
In an effort to assuage congressional concerns, the FTC issued 
a series of binding policy statements that would make consumer 
harm the touchstone of its consumer protection agenda. First, the 
unfairness statements set up a cost-benefit framework, in which the 
Commission would challenge a practice as unfair only if: (1) it 
created substantial consumer injury; (2) that was not outweighed 
by any benefits to consumers or to competition; and (3) it was not 
reasonably avoidable by consumers. 41  The FTC’s deception 
statement requires that a statement be “false or misleading” and 
“material,” in the sense that it impacted the consumer’s purchasing 
decision.42 In this manner, the concept of materiality acts as an 
                                                
 38 See MacLeod et al., supra note 35, at 942, for a full discussion of this 
episode. For a discussion of the FTC’s activism against advertising, see also 
JOHN E. CALFEE, FEAR OF PERSUASION: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON ADVERTISING 
AND REGULATION 11–15 (1997). 
 39 The FTC as National Nanny, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1978, at A22. 
 40 See William E. Kovacic, The FTC and Congressional Oversight of Antitrust 
Enforcement, 17 TULSA L.J. 587, 665–66 (1982) (detailing these restrictions and 
noting that the rancor over the FTC caused its funding to lapse twice, causing 
the Agency to shut its doors). 
 41 The Commission first issued the Unfairness Policy Statement in 1980, and 
later made it binding precedent by appending to the International Harvester 
decision. See Fed. Trade. Comm’n, Policy Statement on Unfairness, appended to 
In re International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm. Congress eventually codified 
the Unfairness Policy Statement with the 1994 FTC Reauthorization Act. 
 42 See FTC Policy Statement on Deception, appended to Cliffdale Assoc., Inc., 
103 F.T.C. 110, 175–83 (1984), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-
decept.htm. The Commission also issued a statement on advertising 
substantiation in Thompson Medical. FTC Policy Statement Regarding 
Advertising Substantiation, appended to Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C. 	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indirect harm requirement—when a false statement is material, it 
can be assumed to cause harm because it triggered a consumer 
purchase that otherwise would not have happened. If the unfairness 
test lays out a quasi-negligence standard (liable only when costs 
are greater than the benefits), the deception test is one of strict 
liability for false claims, under the assumption that false claims are 
never beneficial.43 
This harm-based approach has led the FTC from an agency on 
the brink of extinction to a world-class consumer protection 
agency.44 Since the turn of the century, it has used its unfairness 
and deception enforcement authorities to craft consumer protection 
policies for the Internet economy, including in the areas of online 
and mobile disclosures, privacy, and data security.45 
C. Concurrent FTC-DOT Consumer Protection Jurisdiction Over 
OTAs 
As noted above, the DOT has jurisdiction over “ticket agents,” 
which are defined to include an entity that “ . . . holds itself out as 
                                                                                                         
648, 839 (1984), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1983/03/ftc-policy-
statement-regarding-advertising-substantiation. 
 43  See J. Howard Beales III, former Director of Bureau of Consumer 
Protection, The FTC’s Use of Unfairness Authority: Its Rise, Fall, and 
Resurrection, Remarks at The Marketing & Public Policy Conference (May 30, 
2003) [hereinafter Beales] (“deception analysis essentially creates a shortcut, 
assuming that, when a material falsehood exists, the practice would not pass the 
full benefit/cost analysis of unfairness, because there are rarely, if ever, 
countervailing benefits to deception”), https://www.ftc.gov/public-
statements/2003/05/ftcs-use-unfairness-authority-its-rise-fall-and-resurrection. 
This is analogous to the distinction between rule of reason and per se rules of 
liability in antitrust. A rule of reason inquiry requires an explicit showing of 
actual or likely harm, whereas harm is assumed to be greater than benefits from 
the categories of per se illegal conduct, such as naked agreements to fix prices 
or allocate markets. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Per se Violations in Antitrust 
Law: Confusing Offenses with Defenses, 77 GEO. L J. 165, 179–80 (1988). 
 44 See James C. Cooper, Forward, in James Campbell Cooper ed., THE 
REGULATORY REVOLUTION AT THE FTC: A THIRTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE ON 
COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION at x (Oxford University Press 2013) 
 45 See infra notes 73–79 and accompanying text. 
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selling, providing, or arranging for, air transportation.”46 Although 
Congress clearly did not anticipate OTAs when it originally 
brought ticket agents under the then-CAB’s authority, the courts 
have given the definition a broad reading. In Sabre, Inc. v. 
Department of Transportation for example, Sabre argued that 
DOT’s interpretation of “ticket agent” that included computer 
reservation systems (“CRSs”) that were unaffiliated with airlines 
was an impermissible reading of the statute.47 The D.C. Circuit 
disagreed, holding that the change in the CRS industry was 
immaterial to whether Congress meant to allow DOT jurisdiction 
over modern CRSs: 
Congress did not define “ticket agents” as persons who are 
travel agents, nor make the ability to issue a ticket the test of being 
a ticket agent, but rather defined the words in terms of specific 
activities, i.e., persons selling air transportation, offering it for sale, 
or holding themselves out as selling or arranging for air 
transportation. That CRSs and travel agents conduct related but 
somewhat different functions in the distribution chain is . . . 
irrelevant.48 
To avoid duplicative and potentially contradictory regulation, 
Congress exempted from FTC jurisdiction “common carriers 
subject to the Acts to regulate commerce,” which the FTC Act 
defines as entities “subject to regulation as interstate transportation 
providers or subject to the Communications Act of 1934.” 49 
Accordingly, the FTC clearly lacks jurisdiction over airlines’ ticket 
sales and has admitted as much. 50 However, because OTAs are not 
                                                
 46 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(45) (2012). 
 47 Sabre, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 429 F.3d 1113, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 48 Id. at 1125. 
 49 15 U.S.C. § 44 (2006). 
 50 For example, when proposing a revision to its “Guides for the Use of 
Environmental Marketing Claims,” the FTC initially used an airline 
advertisement as an example of a potentially deceptive claim about carbon 
offsets, see Air Transport Association, Comment Letter on the Federal Trade 
Commission’s Proposed Revisions to the Guides for the Use of Environmental 
Marketing Claims (Dec. 10, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/public_comments/guides-use-environmental-marketing-claims-
project-no.p954501-00314%C2%A0/00314-57127.pdf. The statement 	  
192 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 17: 179 
common carriers, but merely sell tickets for common carriers, the 
FTC takes the position that they are not covered by the FTC Act’s 
common carrier exemption.51 
Thus, it would seem that the FTC and DOT share concurrent 
consumer protection jurisdiction over OTAs’ sales of airline 
tickets. To this point, conflict has been avoided because the FTC 
seemingly has ceded its jurisdiction over the airfare piece of OTAs 
to DOT.52 Two developments suggest that regulatory conflict—and 
all of its attendant costs, which are discussed below—may be 
looming just beyond the horizon. First, privacy and data security 
issues in e-commerce are becoming the preeminent part of the 
FTC’s consumer protection portfolio.53 As an artifact of the nature 
of their business and the substantial role that they play in e-
commerce, OTAs collect volumes of sensitive consumer data. 
Further, it is likely to be harder to compartmentalize data practices 
than to design different displays for various product line offerings. 
Thus, to the extent that the FTC was to extend its consumer 
protection authority to data practices of OTAs based on hotels and 
cars, whatever it prescribed would almost necessarily bleed into 
the airline sales side, necessitating DOT and FTC coordination.54 
                                                                                                         
accompanying the final version of the guidelines replaced the example of an 
airline advertisement with an OTA advertisement, noting “the airline industry is 
exempt from Section 5 of the FTC Act . . . . The Commission, however, has 
jurisdiction over non-carrier third parties . . . .” FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE 
GREEN GUIDES: STATEMENT OF BASIS AND PURPOSE 21 (2012). 
 51  FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 50, at 21. That Congress assigned 
jurisdiction over only airlines, and not ticket agents, in COPPA also suggests 
that FTC and DOJ enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over ticket agents. See 15 
U.S.C. § 6505(c). 
 52 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 50, at 21. 
 53 See supra note 9, at 1.  
 54 Indeed, FTC and DOT met to discuss privacy issues because of their 
potentially overlapping authority. See FOURTH MEETING OF ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON AVIATION CONSUMER PROTECTION, MINUTES, (May 21, 2013) 
http://www.airlineinfo.com/ostpdf88/135.pdf. At that meeting, a representative 
from the FTC noted that the changing industry landscape is leading to “an 
overlap between and DOT and FTC jurisdiction.” Id. at 10. 
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The second circumstance that threatens to bring FTC and DOT 
into conflict is DOT’s position that websites that provide flight 
search tools and derive advertising revenue from this display, but 
which do not themselves sell tickets, qualify as “ticket agents” for 
the purpose of its consumer protection regulation.55 As explained 
above, this new proposal would bring online sites like Google, 
Kayak, and Trip Advisor, under its consumer protection 
jurisdiction.56 As DOT expands its consumer protection jurisdiction 
from its core area of expertise into online advertising sites, it will 
encroach into a regulatory space that the FTC has owned since e-
commerce began. 
III. THE COSTS OF REGULATORY REDUNDANCY 
Regulatory duplication is widespread and almost never by 
design, but rather “unintended or incidental to other aims, typically 
emerging as the byproduct of the policy ad hoc process through 
which agencies are designed.” 57  That is the case here. When 
Congress vested consumer protection oversight over airlines to 
DOT, it did so understanding that the FTC lacked jurisdiction over 
common carriers.58 Congress could not have imagined OTAs, or 
that by including “ticket agents” in DOT’s jurisdiction, would 
create a regulatory redundancy that impacted a large share of 
Internet commerce. Such redundancies give rise to two broad 
inefficiencies. First, it is wasteful to have two agencies performing 
essentially the same task. Second, it is costly for regulated entities 
to adapt to two potentially conflicting standards. 
A. Government Inefficiencies Due to Duplication of Effort and 
Coordination Costs 
It is wasteful for taxpayers to foot the bill for two agencies to 
perform what is essentially the same function, but this is the status 
                                                
 55 See, e.g., Hipmunk, Inc., DOT Order 2013-8-8, Docket No. OST-2013-
0004 (Aug. 20, 2013); see also In re Trip Advisor (2012). 
 56 79 Fed. Reg. at 29,973 (May 23, 2014). 
 57 Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 184 
(2011). 
 58 See 15 U.S.C. § 44 (2006). 
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quo with respect to OTAs. Currently, although the FTC has 
claimed jurisdiction over the full gamut of OTA offerings, it has 
essentially abdicated its jurisdiction with respect to airfare 
offerings.59 Given DOT’s limited jurisdiction (limited only to the 
sale of air transportation), the current state of affairs guarantees 
that two agencies will perform oversight of OTAs when it could be 
done as effectively with one.60 
Potentially overlapping jurisdiction also leads to coordination 
costs, which can be substantial.61 When one agency wants to take a 
regulatory action, it must devote staff time to consult with its sister 
agency. FTC and DOJ, for example, must coordinate in merger 
reviews and antitrust investigations, as both enforce the Sherman 
Act.62 These consultations can lead to ugly turf battles, which delay 
investigations.63 Until recently, there appeared to be little in the 
way of coordination between FTC and DOT with respect to 
consumer protection authority over OTAs. As privacy and data 
security have mushroomed into the top consumer protection issues, 
DOT and FTC reportedly have begun to discuss their regulatory 
approaches.64 Given the role that OTAs play in e-commerce, it will 
be important for FTC and DOT to harmonize their approaches to 
how OTAs collect, use, and store consumer data. Such 
harmonization, however, is not free. It is true that when agencies 
must coexist in regulatory space, coordination is preferable to the 
                                                
 59 This may be a rational response to unclear jurisdictional boundaries. See id. 
(noting that abdication is the primary vehicle through which agencies avoid 
conflict). 
 60 See supra Part II.A. 
 61 See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory 
Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1182 (2012), [hereinafter Freeman and Rossi]. 
 62  See MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION AND THE ANTITRUST DIVISION OF THE UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONCERNING CLEARANCE PROCEDURES FOR 
INVESTIGATION at 5, (Mar. 5, 2002), http://www.justice.gov/atr/memorandum-
agreement-between-federal-trade-commission-and-antiturst-division-united-
states. 
 63 Freeman and Rossi, supra note 61, at 1146, 1165–66. 
 64 See supra note 9, at 1. 
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alternative—inconsistent policies.65 However, the ideal solution is 
to avoid these costs altogether, which can be accomplished through 
consolidation of functions. 
B. Industry Costs From Compliance with Multiple and 
Inconsistent Regulatory Regimes 
Not only is overlapping jurisdiction inefficient government, it 
forces industry to comply with multiple, and potentially 
inconsistent regulatory regimes. This is especially the case for 
OTAs given DOT’s incomplete jurisdiction; DOT can regulate 
only the airfare piece of an OTA’s offering. Thus, OTAs must 
comply with Section 5’s requirement for hotel and car rental 
offerings, and DOT regulation for airfare offerings. Discrepancies 
between FTC and DOT policies are especially troubling because 
they enforce identical statutory language. As noted in Part II, 
Congress designed DOT’s consumer protection authority to be a 
carbon copy of the FTC’s. Having “unfair and deceptive” mean 
one thing to DOT and another to FTC is the model of poor 
governance and surely increases business uncertainty. 
Such a scenario is not merely an academic hypothetical. Take 
for example the “full fare” provisions from EAPP-II and DOT’s 
most recent proposed consumer protection regulation to require 
OTAs to disclose affiliations and financial arrangements that they 
may have with certain airlines, and order their search results in a 
“non-biased” manner.66 The FTC does not mandate such displays 
or disclosures, nor require any ordering for searches. 67 
Accordingly, OTAs must develop one type of display and search 
algorithm for airfares and another for hotels and cars. These 
requirements may be especially burdensome as mobile interfaces 
play an increasingly important role in OTA sales.68 
                                                
 65 See Freeman and Rossi, supra note 61, at 1173–81 (noting executive branch 
tools for managing duplication). 
 66 79 Fed. Reg. 29970 (May 23, 2014). 
 67 See infra note 90. 
 68 See Marcello Gasdia, Mobile Travel Shopping Hits Tipping Point – But PC 
Still Dominates Booking (Jan. 2015), http://www.phocuswright.com/Travel-	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Another area that highlights further potential inefficiencies is 
privacy and data security. As noted above, FTC, DOT, and 
industry representatives recently met to discuss privacy and data 
security as it relates to online booking of air travel.69 Importantly, 
the DOT representative explained that it would find a privacy or 
data security practice unfair under Section 41712 in broader 
circumstances than the FTC would find a violation of Section 5.70 
More specifically, he explained that it would target an airline or an 
OTA for committing an “unfair” act or practice if its data practices 
“violated a public policy” or engaged in “immoral” behavior.71 
These factors represent a more stringent application of unfairness 
than Section 5: the FTC jettisoned morality as an unfairness factor 
in the 1980s, and can consider public policy only as an additional 
factor—it alone cannot serve as the basis for a Section 5 
violation. 72  Thus, OTAs must contend with two potentially 
different privacy and security standards: one for data collected 
from consumers related to hotel rooms and car rentals, and another 
for data collected for airfares.73 
IV. THE CASE FOR THE FTC 
Not only does efficiency call for eliminating costly duplicative 
regulation of OTAs, but it also calls for vesting authority with the 
agency best equipped to handle the task. The evidence suggests 
that authority should fall to the FTC. First, as explained above, 
only the FTC has current authority to oversee the entire OTA 
portfolio of offerings, which allows it to enjoy scope economies in 
                                                                                                         
Research/Research-Updates/2015/Mobile-Travel-Shopping-Hits-Tipping-Point-
But-PC-Still-Dominates-Booking#.VhGKI0uKnx8. 
 69 See supra note 54. 
 70 See supra note 54, at 9–10. 
 71 See supra note 54, at 11. 
 72 See FTC Unfairness Policy Statement, Appended to International Harvester 
Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1076 (1984); see also Beales supra note 43. 
 73 As a practical matter, it may be difficult to segregate airfare data from hotel 
and car data—especially for consumers who purchase bundles of two or more 
services for one itinerary. Thus, as a practical matter OTAs may adhere to DOT 
standard for all data. 
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enforcement.74 Second, while DOT’s roots are in the regulation of 
transportation, the FTC has been the nation’s consumer protection 
agency for a century, having developed substantial expertise in 
advertising generally and online markets, in particular. Third, the 
FTC’s ex-post enforcement-centered approach is far more flexible 
than DOT’s ex-ante rule-based approach. Finally, the FTC’s 
actions are subject to more stringent internal and external checks, 
and the FTC is less likely to suffer from regulatory capture than 
DOT. 
A.  Scope Economies in Enforcement 
If moving oversight of OTA airfare offerings from one agency 
to another merely shifted costs from one agency to another, society 
should be indifferent between sole or dual jurisdiction over OTAs. 
This, however, is not the case; resting sole jurisdiction with the 
FTC is likely to be far less expensive and more effective for 
taxpayers than shared jurisdiction. 
First, leaving aside the relative institutional advantages that the 
FTC enjoys in this regulatory space (discussed below), sole FTC 
oversight of OTAs is more cost effective for the simple reason that 
the FTC can police all OTA offerings at once—something DOT 
could not perform absent Congressional expansion of its 
jurisdiction. Second, given the FTC’s expertise in e-commerce, 
scope economies in enforcement means that consolidating OTA 
oversight with the FTC is likely to reduce total government outlays 
by almost the entire amount that DOT currently devotes to OTA 
consumer protection enforcement without any degradation of 
consumer protection.75 Indeed, as explained in more detail below, 
the FTC’s expertise and harm-centered approach is likely to 
improve regulation in this space. Moreover, not only will the 
FTC’s e-commerce experience provide it an advantage in 
addressing the online sale of air transportation, any experience it 
                                                
 74 See supra Parts I.B and I.C. 
 75 This point has equal force with respect to proposed DOT jurisdiction over 
websites that advertise airfares, but do not sell them. See supra notes 15–19 and 
accompanying text. 
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were to gain from policing the online sale of air transportation 
would complement the remainder of its enforcement portfolio. 76 
For example, the FTC recently addressed the identical issue 
animating DOT’s “full fare advertising” rule. In 2012, the FTC 
sent letters to 22 hotel operators warning them that failure to 
disclose resort and other fees associated with hotel bookings on 
their websites potentially would violate the FTC Act.77 Although 
the FTC’s warning letters were targeted at hotel operators rather 
than OTAs, the similarity of the consumer protection issues and 
industries involved suggest that that the marginal cost for the FTC 
to address any perceived problems with OTAs’ sale of airline 
tickets would be close to zero. 
B. Institutional Competence 
The DOT was created in 1966 to oversee the nation’s interstate 
transportation systems: rails, roads, and aviation.78 Its role with 
respect to the commercial airline industry was that of traditional 
utility regulator: through the CAB, it approved pricing, routes, and 
entry based on a “just and reasonable” standard.79 Its consumer 
protection jurisdiction over airline pricing was an artifact of the 
political compromises involved in airline deregulation, largely due 
to the fact that FTC lacked jurisdiction over common carriers, 
including airlines.80 The legislative history makes clear that the 
                                                
 76  It is an economic truism dating back to the 1800s that combining 
complements creates efficiencies. See James C. Cooper et. al., Vertical Antitrust 
Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 639, 643 (2005). 
 77 FTC Warns Hotel Operators that Price Quotes that Exclude ‘Resort Fees’ 
and Other Mandatory Surcharges May Be Deceptive (Nov. 28, 2012), at 28, 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/11/ftc-warns-hotel-
operators-price-quotes-exclude-resort-fees-other. (The FTC has conducted a 
large amount of research on disclosures, generally.) 
 78 U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, THE UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION: A BRIEF HISTORY (last accessed March 12, 
2015), available at http://ntl.bts.gov/historian/history.html. 
 79 See Viscusi et al., supra note 16, at 612–13. 
 80 See H.R. Rep. No. 98-793, at 2861–62 (1984). Congress concluded that it 
would have to pass separate legislation to give the FTC jurisdiction over 
airlines. It was opposed to this path in large part due to a concern over the FTC’s 	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consumer protection issues concerning Congress did not involve 
advertising or other issues related to the sale of airline tickets.81 
Rather, Congress felt that DOT would be in the best position to use 
the CAB’s old consumer protection power to address issues 
involving airline conduct, such as “overbooking and denied 
boarding compensation, limitations on liability for lost or damaged 
baggage, smoking, [and] discrimination against the 
handicapped.”82 In short, although DOT clearly enjoys substantial 
expertise in the field of airline safety and industry practice, there is 
nothing unique about DOT’s airline industry expertise that 
provides it with an advantage in regulating OTA sales of airline 
tickets. That is, DOT’s experience with the airline industry is not 
likely to enhance its ability to identify practices relating to the 
sales of tickets that threaten to harm consumers. In economic 
jargon, because the marginal value of DOT’s airline industry 
expertise to its consumer protection mission is low, the regulatory 
economies of scope gained by combining consumer protection 
with other regulatory issues facing airlines are likely quite small. 
Regulating consumer-facing airline travel displays of OTAs and 
search engines is light years from the issues that originally led 
Congress to vest DOT with this consumer protection authority. 
On the other hand, the FTC’s expertise is not related to one 
industry, but to consumer protection across all industries; Congress 
created the FTC to protect consumers from abusive marketplace 
practices.83 Its pedigree as the nation’s primary enforcer against 
fraud and deception in advertising since 1938 leaves it with 
unsurpassed knowledge among regulatory bodies in identifying 
marketing practices that are likely to harm consumers.84 In the past 
year alone, the FTC brought 58 cases involving deceptive 
                                                                                                         
cumbersome rulemaking process and the fact that DOT would still have 
authority to review international charter flight tariffs. See id. at 2862. 
 81 Id. at 2862. 
 82 Id. at 2860. 
 83  Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two 
Policies at War with Each Other, 121 YALE L.J. 2216, 2219–20 (2012). 
 84 Id. 
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advertising, 85  held three consumer protection workshops, 86  and 
issued guidance on a “green” product claim, weight loss claims, 
and sports equipment concussion protection claims.87 Moreover, 
this year the D.C. Circuit in POM Wonderful, LLC v. FTC, noted 
the FTC’s “special expertise in determining what sort of 
substantiation is necessary to assure that advertising is not 
deceptive.”88 
                                                
 85 See Federal Trade Commission, Legal Resources, http://www.ftc.gov/tips-
advice/business-center/legal-resources?title=&type=case&field_consumer_ 
protection_topics_tid=229&field_industry_tid=All&field_date_value[min][date]
=January%201%2C%202014&field_date_value[max][date]=March%201%2C%
202015&sort_by=field_date_value&page=1 (showing Advertising and 
Marketing cases reported from January 1, 2014 to March 1, 2015).  
 86 Federal Trade Commission, Fraud Affects Every Community (Oct. 29, 
2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2014/10/fraud-affects-
every-community; Federal Trade Commission, Big Data: Tool for Inclusion or 
Exclusion (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/ 
2014/09/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion; Federal Trade Commission, Care 
Labeling Rule (March 28, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-
calendar/2014/03/care-labeling-rule-ftc-roundtable.  
 87 See e.g., Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Staff Warns 
Plastic Waste Bag Marketers That Their “Oxodegradable” Claims May Be 
Deceptive (Oct. 21, 2014), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2014/10/ftc-staff-warns-plastic-waste-bag-marketers-their-oxodegradable; 
Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Alerts Major Retailers to 
Concerns About Concussion Protection Claims for Athletic Mouthguards Made on 
Websites (Aug. 21, 2014), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/ press-
releases/2014/08/ftc-alerts-major-retailers-concerns-about-concussion-protection; 
Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Has Updated Guidance for 
Media Outlets on Spotting False Weight-Loss Claims in Advertising (Jan. 7, 
2014), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/01/ftc-
has-updated-guidance-media-outlets-spotting-false-weight-loss.  
 88 POM at 22; see also POM at 18 (noting the FTC’s “particular expertise” in 
determining whether an advertisement sets forth an “efficacy” or 
“establishment” claim); id. at 15 (“The Commission is often in a better position 
than are courts to determine when a practice is deceptive within the meaning of 
the Federal Trade Commission FTC Act, and that admonition is especially true 
with respect to allegedly deceptive advertising since the finding of a § 5 
violation in that this field rests so heavily on inference and pragmatic 
judgment.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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Not only is the FTC the preeminent agency on advertising, it 
has unique expertise with respect to the Internet economy. As 
Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen recently explained, the FTC 
has consumer protection jurisdiction over the “vast majority of 
commercial activity on the Internet,” and the agency has exercised 
this jurisdiction to shape norms in online advertising, privacy, and 
data security.89 For example, in the early part of the millennium, 
the FTC used its Section 5 authority to force search engines to 
more prominently demark paid search results from organic search 
results.90 Since the early days of e-commerce, it has used its broad 
Section 5 authority in an attempt to craft a uniform regulatory 
approach to privacy and data security concerns. In 1998, the FTC 
brought its first case against a firm for failing to live up to a 
promise to care for consumers’ data.91 
Since that time, the FTC has brought over 240 cases involving 
privacy and data security.92 This enforcement—along with several 
influential reports—has crafted current U.S. policy on data security 
and privacy.93 Additionally, the FTC has been at the forefront of 
addressing consumer protection issues associated with mobile 
broadband communications. Last year, for example, the FTC filed 
                                                
 89  The Procrustean Problem With Prescriptive Regulation, Remarks of 
Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Commissioner, U.S. Federal Trade Commission (2014), 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/291361/140318fsf
.pdf. 
 90 See FTC Consumer Protection Staff Updates Agency’s Guidance to Search 
Engine Industry on the Need to Distinguish Between Advertisements and Search 
Results (June 25, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/ 
06/ftc-consumer-protection-staff-updates-agencys-guidance-search. 
 91  See GeoCities http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/982-
3015/geocities. 
 92 The FTC has brought over 130 spam and spyware cases, more than 40 
general privacy lawsuits, over 50 data security cases, and over 20 cases related 
to COPPA. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY 
UPDATE 2–7 (2015), available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ 
reports/privacy-data-security-update-2014/privacydatasecurityupdate_2014.pdf. 
 93 See Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel Solove, The FTC’s Common Law of 
Privacy, 114 COLUMBIA L. REV. 583 (2014). (In light of its expertise, Congress 
chose the FTC to administer the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act 
(COPPA).) See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506. 
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consumer protection complaints against Google, Apple, and 
Amazon for failing to disclose purchase windows for in-app 
purchases.94 The FTC is also involved in litigation over AT&T’s 
failure to disclose its policy of “throttling” the data of consumers 
on unlimited data plans.95 
The FTC also has a superior capability to engage in research 
that informs consumer protection policy. Congress set up the FTC 
to become a “norm-creator” in large part through studying 
markets.96 To help the Commission fulfill this role, Congress gave 
it the power to subpoena industries for data with which to conduct 
studies.97 The FTC has used this power recently to examine privacy 
issues surrounding data brokers, and currently it is collecting 
information on patent assertion entities to explore the extent to 
which their practices give rise to consumer protection concerns.98 
The FTC also conducts several workshops every year, in which it 
convenes industry experts and leading academics to gather 
                                                
 94 Complaint, In the Matter of Google, Inc., No. 122 3237 (Sep. 4, 2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140904googleplaycmpt.pdf; 
Complaint, FTC v. Amazon, Inc., No. 2-14-cv-01038 (July 10, 2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140710amazoncmpt1.pdf; 
Complaint, In the Matter of Apple, Inc., No. 112 3108 (Jan. 15, 2014), available 
at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/140115applecmpt.pdf. 
 95 See FTC Says AT&T Has Misled Millions of Consumers with ‘Unlimited’ 
Data Promises, Federal Trade Commission, (Oct. 28, 2014), 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/10/ftc-says-att-has-misled-
millions-consumers-unlimited-data. 
 96 See William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the 
Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST 
L.J. 929, 931 (2010) (One of the motivations for creating the FTC was to 
establish “abody that could conduct investigations and prepare studies as well as 
bring administrative cases, so that Section 5 litigation would be embedded in a 
broad understanding of business practices and their implications.”). 
 97 See 15 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2006). 
 98 See Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability, Federal 
Trade Commission, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-
brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-
2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf; see also Patent Assertion Entities, (PAE) 
study, Federal Trade Commission, http://www.ftc.gov/policy/studies/patent-
assertion-entities-pae-study. 
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information about new issues. These workshops often lead to 
reports recommending policy or guidance for industry. 
For example, in 2009 to 2010, the FTC held a series of 
workshops throughout the country to solicit opinions on privacy 
and data security issues. This information gathering resulted in a 
2012 report that in many ways operates as a de facto FTC policy 
statement that guides industry practice in this space. 99  More 
recently, the FTC released a report on privacy issues surrounding 
the Internet of Things, based on a workshop of the same name a 
year ago.100 Further, its workshop on “Drip Pricing” —the very 
issues that animated the pricing component of the EAPP— formed 
the basis for the group of warning letters sent to hotel operators 
concerning failure to disclose “resort” or other fees. 101  To 
summarize, Congress gave the FTC a capability that DOT lacks: 
the ability to conduct in-depth studies of marketplace practices to 
create legal norms. 
On the whole, the FTC’s expertise easily generalizes to the 
airline industry, whereas it’s unclear that expertise in the airline 
                                                
 99 The lack of empirical evidence and rigid cost-benefit analysis to support the 
FTC’s policy recommendations in the privacy and data security area has drawn 
some critics. See, e.g., Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, Dissent from Internet of 
Things Report (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ 
public_statements/620701/150127iotjdwstmt.pdf; James C. Cooper, Comment 
on FTC Strategic Plan 2014-2018, (Sept. 30, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2333794. 
100 The Internet of Things: Privacy & Security in a Connected World, Federal 
Trade Commission, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-
trade-commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-
things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf. 
 101 FTC Warns Hotel Operators that Price Quotes that Exclude ‘Resort Fees’ 
and Other Mandatory Surcharges May Be Deceptive, Federal Trade 
Commission, (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2012/11/ftc-warns-hotel-operators-price-quotes-exclude-resort-fees-other. 
The FTC has conducted a large amount of research on disclosures generally. See 
also FTC James M. Lacko and Janis K. Pappalardo, The Effect of Mortgage 
Broker Compensation Disclosures on Consumers and Competition: A 
Controlled Experiment, (Feb. 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/reports/effect-mortgage-broker-compensation-disclosures-
consumers-and-competition-controlled-experiment/030123mortgagefullrpt.pdf. 
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industry provides any advantage in addressing consumer protection 
issues surrounding the online sales of air travel. 
That is, although airline industry expertise—which DOT 
undoubtedly possesses—is valuable in setting safety standards or 
addressing consumer issues like chronic delays or baggage issues, 
it provides no advantage in addressing issues like online 
advertising, privacy, or data security. Accordingly, if the FTC were 
to replace DOT as the primarily regulator of airline sales on OTAs, 
any reduction in institutional competence from a loss in airline 
industry expertise would be more than offset by the enormous 
gains in consumer protection expertise, particularly expertise on 
issues surrounding the Internet economy. 
C. Flexibility from Ex-Post, Harm-Based Enforcement 
As a general matter, agencies typically have two tools in their 
arsenals to enforce their statutory mandate: (1) ex ante rulemaking 
and (2) ex post case-by-case enforcement. The former avenue 
typically involves a “notice and comment” procedure, in which the 
agency collects information, considers various stakeholder 
viewpoints, and ultimately promulgates a regulation with the force 
of law that proscribes certain practices.102 Regulated entities that 
engage in these practices are consequently deemed to have violated 
the relevant statutory provisions. Alternatively, under an ex post 
enforcement strategy, the agency issues complaints against 
regulated entities that are alleged to have engaged in conduct that 
violates the relevant statutory provisions. Depending on the 
agency, the case proceeds either through federal district courts or 
administrative adjudication. 
As noted above, DOT regulates OTAs primarily through 
rulemaking that proscribes certain conduct deemed to violate 
Section 41712.103 The FTC—due in large part to the backlash that 
resulted from its rulemaking frenzy in the 1970s—has abandoned 
rulemaking and instead relies on a case-by-case enforcement 
                                                
 102 See 5 U.S.C. § 553; Viscusi et al., supra note 16 at 23. 
 103 See supra Part II.A. 
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strategy that is centered on consumer harm.104 Although most cases 
are settled, the series of consent decrees together with the few 
judicial and Commission decisions have created a quasi-common 
law in the areas of advertising and privacy.105 As noted above, a 
common law of consumer protection created by FTC enforcement 
clearly has a deterrent impact on firms’ behavior. There is an 
important distinction, however, in the case of the FTC’s harm-
centered approach. Whereas a DOT rule proscribes a practice 
entirely, Section 5 proscribes a practice only if the FTC can show 
that it is harmful to consumers in each enforcement action—
directly in unfairness, and indirectly through the materiality 
requirement in deception. 106  This distinction has important 
implications for the relative ability of these agencies to deal with 
changing conditions. 
In theory, ex ante regulation and ex post enforcement can 
arrive at identical regulatory regimes. Once a case has been 
decided against one entity, it provides other regulated entities with 
information about the agency’s enforcement posture; a successful 
challenge to practice A will deter others from engaging in A just as 
a rule would formally proscribe others from engaging in A. In one 
important aspect, however, ex post enforcement differs from ex 
ante rulemaking: flexibility. When conditions change rapidly or 
entities subject to regulation vary, the same conduct may not 
always violate the statute. 
To explain the point more formally, consider a regulator who 
must choose a level of care, X, for regulated entities to take. In the 
case of consumer protection, X may be the level of substantiation 
required to make a health claim, the type of disclosure needed in 
an online display, or the level of data security. The higher the level 
of substantiation, the greater the level of disclosure, or the more 
resources devoted to making data secure (the higher the X chosen), 
                                                
 104 The FTC has promulgated rules pursuant to specific statutes (e.g., COPPA; 
Do Not Call; Safe Guards; and Fairness to Contact Lens Consumers Act). 
 105 See Hartzog & Solove, supra note 93. 
 106 For cases that settle, the Commission need only to find “reason to believe” 
that there has been a violation of the FTC Act and that accepting the settlement 
is “in the public interest.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). 
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the less likely consumers are to suffer harm (i.e., being materially 
misled or having their identity stolen). Such precautions, however, 
are costly; data security requires software, computer engineers, and 
information about possible threats; and substantiation requires 
expensive clinical trials, and extensive disclosures take valuable 
space from other information and risk increasing consumer 
information overload. So, the goal of the regulator should be to 
require an X that minimizes total social costs (TSC)—the 
summation of expected costs of consumer harm given X and the 
cost for providing X: 
TSC = cX + P(X)*H. (1) 
In (1), c is the cost per unit of care, X. The term P(X) is the 
probability of a harmful event occurring (e.g., a data breach or a 
purchase based on a misrepresentation), and it decreases as more 
care is taken. Finally, H is the level of harm that occurs when a 
harmful event occurs.107 If X* is the level of care that minimizes 
TSC given c, P(X), and H, it is easy to see that as costs of care, 
levels of harm, and harm avoidance technologies vary, so will the 
level of X*. Figure 1 shows the optimal level of care as a function 
of θ, which is a parameter that captures such heterogeneity. This 
heterogeneity can be thought of as differences in circumstances 
across regulated entities at a point in time, or as changes in 
circumstances over time. I assume that higher levels of θ call for 
higher levels of X.108 The distribution of θ is shown as f(θ). 
A regulatory regime based on ex post enforcement is far more 
able than one based on ex ante rules to deal with this type of 
heterogeneity. Because it is able to consider the facts of each case, 
in theory the regulator can craft a specific X* for each level of θ. 
Ex ante rulemaking, on the other hand, will craft a single level of 
care, which will leave a large proportion of entities taking either 
too much or too little care depending on their circumstances. For 
example, suppose that the regulator sets X* based on 𝜃, the average 
                                                
 107 This is the standard model for accident liability. See Steven Shavell, 
Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 177–206. 
 108 For example, θ  could represent sensitivity to harm or lower harm 
avoidance costs. 
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of 𝜃, which is distributed normally as shown in Figure 1.109 From 
society’s standpoint, entities facing 𝜃 > 𝜃 take too little care, and 
those facing 𝜃 < 𝜃 take too much.110 Depending on the variance of 
the distribution, these costs from regulatory mismatch can be 
substantial. What’s more, these costs are magnified to the extent 
that regulators set X* based on something other than 𝜃, which is 
likely to be the case because realistically regulators will lack 
sufficient information about the distribution of 𝜃. For example, 
suppose a regulator over estimates the harm caused by certain 
conduct and sets X* according to 𝜃 > 𝜃. As can be seen in Figure 
1, most of the population suffers from this too stringent standard. 
It is true that rules can change to adapt to changing 
circumstances, but this process is far less nimble than altering ex 
post enforcement posture. For example, if technological changes 
render conduct A benign, or new economic learning suggests that A 
is not harmful, the agency proceeding with an ex post enforcement 
strategy will either recognize this fact and cease challenging A or it 
will suffer defeats in court.111 In either case, the “rule” created by 
enforcement changes, and firms will no longer be deterred from 
conduct A. The formal rule that proscribes A, on the other hand, 
will be far more durable. If an agency recognizes A no longer 
violates the statute, then it must engage in a rulemaking procedure 
to rescind the rule, a long and politically fraught process. If the 
agency still clings to the belief that A is harmful, moreover, then 
repeal of the rule through judicial challenge is almost impossible. 
Because the FTC’s authority is triggered only with consumer 
harm—directly in unfairness, and indirectly through the materiality 
                                                
 109 It can be shown that setting X* based on 𝜃 is optimal from an ex ante 
perspective when a regulator must craft only level of care. See, e.g., Steven 
Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15 
RAND J. ECON. 271 (1984). 
 110 This is because X*(𝜃) is above X*(𝜃) for 𝜃 > 𝜃, and below X*(𝜃) for 𝜃 < 𝜃. 
 111 This scenario occurred with respect to vertical restraints in antitrust. New 
economic learning suggesting that exclusive territories, exclusive dealing, and 
resale price maintenance agreements are likely to give rise to efficiencies led the 
antitrust agencies and courts to adopt a rule of reason approach to these practices 
rather than a per se prohibition. See Cooper et al., supra note 76.  
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requirement in deception—it can calibrate its enforcement posture 
to avoid over- or under-deterrence in a manner the DOT lacks. The 
Commission’s experience using Section 5 to tackle deceptive 
advertising and privacy issues evidences this capacity. For 
example, in the realm of advertising, the FTC has calibrated 
Section 5 to adjust to the burgeoning research on the economics of 
information in the 1970s and 1980s, and the concomitant shift in 
Supreme Court views on commercial speech.112 The Commission’s 
flexible application of Section 5 to advertising substantiation 
through the so-called “Pfizer factors” analysis—an approach 
recently endorsed by the D.C. Circuit113—has been adapted to 
cover industries ranging from sneakers to drugs.114 It mandates a 
sliding scale of required substantiation depending on factors such 
as the type of claim made, the type of product, and the 
consequences of a false claim.115 In the area of privacy and data 
security, the Commission has pursued an approach based on 
“reasonableness,” requiring firms to increase the care taken with 
the sensitivity of the data collected.116 It has used this general 
framework since 1998 to assure that firms—including Internet 
                                                
 112 See William Macleod et al., Three Rules and a Constitution: Consumer 
Protection Finds its Limits in Competition Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L. J. 943, 946 
(2005). 
 113 See POM Wonderful, LLC v. F.T.C., 777 F.3d 478, 490–92 (D.C. Cir. 
2015). 
 114 See Pfizer Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972); Thompson Med Co. v. FTC, 791 F.2d 
189 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also J. Howard Beales, III & Timothy J. Muris, In 
Defense of the Pfizer Factors, in THE REGULATORY REVOLUTION AT THE FTC: 
A THIRTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE ON COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 
83, 91 (James Campbell Cooper ed. 91 (2013). The FTC applied the Pfizer 
analysis to claims by Sketchers, Sketchers Will Pay $40 Million to Settle FTC 
Charges, FED. TRADE. COMM’N (May 16, 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2012/05/skechers-will-pay-40-million-settle-ftc-charges-it-
deceived, and Reebok, Reebok to Pay $25 Million in Consumer Refunds to Settle 
FTC Charges, FED. TRADE. COMM’N (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/press-releases/2011/09/reebok-pay-25-million-customer-refunds-settle-
ftc-charges. 
 115 See Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. at 3064. 
 116 See, e.g., FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID 
CHANGE (2012). 
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economy giants such as Google, Twitter, and Facebook—keep 
their promises with respect to data collection and uses, and 
reasonably protect sensitive data they collect.117 More recently, the 
FTC has applied Section 5 concepts to disclosures involving in-app 
purchases118 and mobile broadband throttling119—issues involving 
industries which would be hard to conceive just 20 years ago, let 
alone at the FTC’s inception in 1914. 
In short, the modern FTC has deftly adapted Section 5 to 
rapidly changing consumer protection issues that have arisen with 
the exponential growth in technology around the Internet. Had the 
FTC relied on rulemaking to mandate specific forms of disclosure 
on mobile platforms, or proscribe certain collection of data, these 
standards would have rapidly become obsolete and retard 
economic activity. Rules also impact innovation—when certain 
conduct is proscribed, companies can be forced to take less 
efficient paths. Indeed, the type of rigid rule-based regime that 
DOT seems increasingly to embrace with respect to online entities 
stands in stark contract to the type of “permissionless” 
environment—one that allows “experimentation with new 
technologies and business models . . . by default” and takes the 
position that “problems, if they develop at all, can be addressed 
later”—that has allowed U.S. technology companies to dominate 
                                                
 117 The first FTC Internet privacy cases involved deceptive data collection by 
GeoCities. See GeoCities, FTC File No. 982-3015 (Fed. Trade. Comm’n Feb 12, 
1999), http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/982-3015/geocities. 
Subsequently, the FTC has entered into consent agreements with Google, 
Google, Docket No. C-4336 (Fed. Trade. Comm’n Nov. 20, 2012), 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/google-inc; Twitter, 
Twitter, Inc., FTC File No. 092-3093 (Fed. Trade. Comm’n Mar. 11, 2011), 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/092-3093/twitter-inc-
corporation; and Facebook, Facebook, Inc., FTC File No. 092-3184 (Fed. Trade. 
Comm’n Aug. 10, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/ 
092-3184/facebook-inc, for privacy practices alleged to have violated Section 5. 
 118 Apple, Inc., FTC File No. 112-3108 (Fed. Trade Comm’n January 23, 
2014), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/112-3108/apple-inc. 
 119 Federal Trade Commission v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 3:14-cv-04785 
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/ 
141028attcmpt.pdf. 
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the world market.120 This is not to say that FTC enforcement adapts 
perfectly to all circumstances. Indeed, some of its recent actions in 
the fields of privacy, data security, and advertising substantiation 
have drawn criticism from prominent observers for being too 
unpredictable or too stringent.121 Nonetheless, the larger point is 
that even if some policies are misguided, any costs they impose on 
the economy will be far less durable than ones imposed by rigid ex 
ante rulemaking. 
Finally, it is important to note that not only is an ex post, harm-
centered enforcement approach more flexible than ex ante 
rulemaking, in most circumstances it will be quicker and cheaper. 
For example, DOT’s EAPP-I began with an Advanced Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking in 2007, and was not final until the end of 
2009.122 The EAPP-II rulemaking took nearly a year from the 
publication of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to the final rule, 
and likely required substantial staff resources to review comments, 
and to draft proposed and final rules as well as statements of basis 
and purpose.123 This accounting does not include the staff time and 
resources that were devoted to the project before the proposals 
were made public. What is more, once adopted, DOT’s rules are 
                                                
 120 ADAM THIERER, PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION vii (2014). 
 121 See, e.g., J. Howard Beales, III & Timothy J. Muris, In Defense of the 
Pfizer Factors, in THE REGULATORY REVOLUTION AT THE FTC: A THIRTY-YEAR 
PERSPECTIVE ON COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 83, 93 (James 
Campbell Cooper ed. 2013) (criticizing some of the FTC’s recent advertising 
substantiation cases); Tom Lenard & Paul H. Rubin, The FTC Then and Now: 
Privacy, in THE REGULATORY REVOLUTION AT THE FTC: A THIRTY-YEAR 
PERSPECTIVE ON COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 109, 110 (James 
Campbell Cooper ed. (2013) (criticizing the FTC’s privacy and data security 
program); James C. Cooper, Identity Theft, Not Big Data, Should be at the Top 
of the FTC’s Priority List, DAILY CALLER (Sept. 24, 2013), 
http://dailycaller.com/2013/09/24/identity-theft-not-big-data-should-be-at-the-
top-of-the-ftcs-priority-list/. 
 122 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 72 Fed. Reg. 65,233 (Nov. 20, 
2007). 
 123 Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,110 (Apr. 25, 
2011). 
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likely to be challenged in court.124 Contrast this experience with 
that of the FTC in adopting Section 5 to data collection, data 
security, mobile “cramming,” throttling, sponsored search 
disclosures, or in-app purchases. The FTC has been able to 
leverage enforcement to address each of these novel concerns in 
the past year. It did not have to wait years for a rulemaking. 
D. External and Internal Constraints 
Internal and external constraints play a large role in shaping the 
field of possible regulatory outcomes. Because the FTC is subject 
to more searching judicial review, and enjoys internal procedures 
that are likely to temper regulatory overreach, its actions are more 
likely than DOT’s to provide consumers with net benefits. Finally, 
because the FTC is not a sectorial regulator, it is unlikely to suffer 
regulatory capture. 
1. Judicial Review 
To the extent that DOT continues to exercise its consumer 
protection jurisdiction through rules rather than adjudication, it 
will face a lower level of judicial scrutiny than the FTC.125 Agency 
rules promulgated through informal rulemaking—the “notice and 
comment” procedure that DOT uses to promulgate rules under 
Section 41712—can be set aside if they are “arbitrary, capricious, 
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”126 
This standard is highly deferential to the agency’s decision: “The 
scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is 
narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency.”127 For example, in Spirit Airlines v. DOT, which involved 
a challenge to DOT’s “refund rule,” the D.C. Circuit explained that 
under the “arbitrary and capricious standard,” “agencies are not 
                                                
 124 See, e.g., Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp. 687 F.3d 403 (D.C. Cir. 
2012); Sabre, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 429 F.3d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 125  See JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JOHN M. VERNON & W. KIPP VISCUSI, 
ECONOMIES OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION, 23 REGULATION (2005) (“[T]here 
are very few binding external controls on the development of regulation”). 
 126 See Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. 
 127 Motor Vehicles Mfg. Ass’n v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 30 
(1983). 
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required to choose the best solution, only a reasonable one.”128 In 
instances in which DOT regulates by interpreting a definition in its 
statute, as long as the term is open to differing definitions, courts 
must defer to any “reasonable” interpretation made by the 
administrator of an executive agency.129 The DOT receives even 
more deference when it regulates by modifying its existing rules—
as it did when adopting the airfare advertising requirements under 
EAPP-II. 130  Courts “give substantial deference to an agency’s 
interpretation of its own regulations,” striking it down only if the 
interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the 
regulation.”131 
In consumer protection adjudication, the FTC can proceed as a 
plaintiff in federal district court,132 or it can file an administrative 
complaint, in which case the matter will be tried before an FTC 
administrative law judge (“ALJ”). 133  When the FTC files a 
complaint in district court that alleges conduct to be unfair or 
deceptive under Section 5, it receives no deference; it is treated just 
as any other plaintiff and must prove the elements of its claim by a 
preponderance of the evidence.134 Under the administrative route, 
the Commission also must prove its case by a preponderance of the 
evidence before an ALJ.135 For example, in the POM trial, the 
Commission needed four experts—each subject to cross-
examination—to prove that consumers reasonably took away 
certain unsubstantiated claims from each of POM’s ads.136 Either 
party can appeal the ALJ’s ruling to the full Commission, and a 
defendant can appeal an adverse Commission decision to a federal 
appeals court, and ultimately to the Supreme Court. 
                                                
 128 Spirit, 687 F.3d at 416 (quoting Petal Gas Storage LLP v. FERC, 496 F.3d 
695, 703 (2007)). 
 129 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 
837, 844 (1984). 
 130 See Spirit, 687 F.3d at 416.  
 131 Id. at 410. 
 132 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (2006). 
 133 15 U.S.C. § 13(b). 
 134 See FTC v. Abbott Labs, 852 F. Supp. 526 (D.D.C. 1994). 
 135 15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (2006). 
 136 See FTC v. POM Wonderful, LLC, ALJ decision at 71–84. 
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When a federal appeals court reviews an FTC decision that an 
act or practice was deceptive, it will uphold the Commission’s 
finding if it is supported by “substantial evidence.”137 Although this 
standard is deferential, it allows the court to conduct a more 
searching review than the “arbitrary and capricious” standard 
applied to DOT rulemaking.138 As one legal scholar explains, the 
various agency review standards should be thought of as a 
“grading curve set by Congress,” in which “arbitrary and 
capricious, the narrowest review, is equivalent to a pass/fail,” and 
the substantial evidence standard translates into allowing 
regulations with “C” or “B” grades to pass.139 Even less deference 
is owed the Commission for findings of unfairness. Because this 
vague term is potentially so capacious, time and again courts have 
reserved for themselves the last word on how to interpret the 
meaning of “unfairness.”140 Indeed, in recognition of this fact, 
some legal scholars have suggested that the FTC should utilize 
antitrust rulemaking to proscribe certain conduct as “unfair” so that 
its findings would receive more deference in courts.141 
                                                
 137 POM Wonderful, LLC v. F.T.C., 777 F.3d 478, 490–92 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 138 See Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards, 
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679, 687–88 (2002). 
 139 Id. at 692688. 
 140 See e.g., FTC v. Boise Cascade Corp., 637 F.2d 573, 581 (9th Cir. 1980) 
(“The policies calling for deference to the Commission are, of course, in tension 
with the acknowledged responsibility of the courts to interpret Section 5.”); see 
also Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. F. T. C., 630 F.2d 920, 927 (2d Cir. 1980 (as 
to who determines what conduct violates Section 5, “The final word is left to the 
courts”). See generally James C. Cooper, The Perils of Excessive Discretion: 
The Elusive Meaning of Unfairness in Section 5 of the FTC Act, 34 J. 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 87, 93–97 (2015). 
 141 See Royce Zeisler, Note: Chevron Deference and the FTC: How and Why 
the FTC Should Use Chevron To Improve Antitrust Enforcement, 2014 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 266, 291–98 (2014) (suggesting that the FTC could promulgate 
“fine-grained presumptions” for subsequent Section 5 litigation that will receive 
Chevron deference); see Justin Hurwitz, Chevron and the Limits of 
Administrative Antitrust, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 212 (2010). 
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As a practical matter, these differing standards of review mean 
that inefficient rules promulgated by DOT are more durable than 
similar “rules” adopted by the FTC through litigation.142 
Further, even if upheld by an appellate court, an FTC decision 
finding unfairness or deception is far more fragile than an agency 
rule that survives a legal challenge. Once challenged 
unsuccessfully, an agency rule cannot be challenged again—the 
rule’s provisions bind everyone subject to it. An FTC decision, 
even one upheld by an appellate court, binds only the party to the 
litigation. True, it serves as precedent, and as such may discourage 
entities from engaging in the conduct condemned as unfair or 
deceptive. This precedent, however, will apply only in the circuit 
of the reviewing court. Further, decisions can be challenged and 
overturned in subsequent litigation. This outcome is more likely 
the more poorly reasoned or inefficient the decision. 
2. Internal Procedures 
The FTC’s internal makeup and procedures also constrain its 
actions. To challenge conduct in district court or through 
administrative litigation, a majority of commissioners must find 
“reason to believe” that the conduct in question violates Section 5 
and that challenging the conduct “is in the public interest.”143 This 
process requires the Commission to find some evidence of 
consumer harm—directly in unfairness, and indirectly through the 
materiality element in deception—in every case that it approves. 
The comparison with DOT is stark: there is no requirement that 
the DOT find consumer harm to initiate a rulemaking proceeding. 
For example, DOT’s recent “display bias” rule proposal rests 
solely on “allegations” that biased displays have been used “to 
disadvantage certain airlines in the course of hard-fought contract 
negotiations,” and “concern[s]” that ticket agents “could sell bias 
to certain airline competitors or bias displays toward carriers that 
                                                
 142 For example, the FTC’s authority over, and approach to data security are 
being challenged in two separate proceedings currently. See LabMD, Inc. v. 
FTC, 776 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2015); F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 
799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 143 15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2006). 
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pay higher segment fee[s].”144 Further, as discussed above, DOT 
need only compile minimal evidence—from public comments and 
even “general experience”—that a practice is generally harmful to 
approve a final rule without fear of a court overturning it.145 Unlike 
the FTC, moreover, DOT’s evidentiary record is never subject to 
cross-examination. After the rule is in place, DOT does not 
consider whether there is actual harm, but only whether a 
defendant has engaged in some proscribed conduct. The 
importance of this distinction cannot be overstated: the FTC can 
condemn conduct only with evidence of direct or indirect 
consumer harm in every case, whereas once a rule is in place, DOT 
can enjoin conduct without a scintilla of evidence of actual 
consumer harm. 
Another important distinction that is likely to lead the FTC 
toward a more reasoned approach to enforcement is that it is a 
collective, rather than a unitary decision maker. Unlike DOT, the 
FTC can proceed only if a majority of Commissioners vote for a 
complaint. Of the five Commissioners that comprise the FTC, only 
three are from the majority party, so as a practical matter minority 
views are often taken into account in an effort to achieve 
consensus in enforcement activities.146 Further, views within the 
majority party voting block are not monolithic, so that even 
enforcement actions approved by a bare majority are often the 
product of consensus. 
A final feature that strengthens FTC’s enforcement is that the 
Commission receives separate recommendations from the Bureau 
of Consumer Protection (“BCP”) and the Bureau of Economics 
(“BE”) for each enforcement action. The BCP recommendation 
will explain why the conduct at issue violates the relevant 
                                                
 144  See Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer 
Protection Issues, 79 Fed. Reg. 29970-01. 
 145 For example, DOT relied in part on comments posted in an online chat 
room (“Regulation Room”) to support its Full Fare advertising rule in EAPP-II. 
See Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 687 F.3d 403, 411 (D.C. Cir. 
2012). 
 146 The overwhelming majority of Commission actions are approved by a 
unanimous vote. 
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provision of the FTC Act (e.g., deception; unfairness), and in the 
case of a consent order, why the proposed remedy is sufficient.147 
The BE recommendation examines the economic rationale for the 
case (e.g., what is the magnitude of consumer harm; does the harm 
outweigh the benefit to consumers or competition), and explains 
how approving an enforcement action may impact market 
performance in the future.148 
3. Regulatory Capture 
Finally, it is worth noting that the FTC is in far less danger than 
the DOT of being “captured.” Capture is a widely studied 
phenomenon in which a regulator aligns its interest with the 
industry it regulates.149 Capture is more likely when a regulator 
faces only one industry, like DOT’s aviation consumer protection 
division. 150  The FTC, on the other hand, does not have a 
constituency. Its general enforcement mandate is spread over 
multiple industries, meaning that there is little repeat play.151 
V. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Sketched out below are some possible solutions to the problem 
of concurrent FTC-DOT consumer protection jurisdiction over 
OTAs. The most major reforms would require congressional action 
                                                
 147 See, e.g., James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, Behavioral Economics 
and Its Meaning for Antitrust Agency Decision Making, 8 J.L. ECON. POLICY 
779, 797 (2012). 
 148 See James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, Behavioral Economics and its 
Implications for Regulatory Behavior, 41 J. REG. ECON. 41, 53–54 (2012). 
 149 JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JOHN M. VERNON & W. KIPP VISCUSI, ECONOMIES 
OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION, 379–80 (2005) (Capture theory “states that 
either the regulation is supplied in response to the industry’s demand for 
regulation . . . or the regulatory agency comes to be controlled by the industry 
over time.”). 
 150 See id. 
 151 See James C. Cooper et al., Theory and Practice of Competition Advocacy 
at the FTC, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1091, 1104 (2005); Remarks of Timothy J. 
Muris, Panel Discussion, in Cooper ed., supra note 44, at 16 (explaining that 
unlike the CAB or OSHA, to which “the capture theory clearly fits,” the FTC 
does not have strong interest groups because most businesses “deal only 
sporadically with the FTC”). 
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and are likely to be the least politically feasible. Some modest 
reforms, however, could be implemented to ameliorate this 
situation with minimal (or no) congressional action. 
The broadest reform that would eliminate the FTC-DOT 
redundancy would be simultaneously to repeal Section 41712 and 
the FTC’s common carrier exemption. Not only would this reform 
allow the FTC to have jurisdiction over OTAs, it additionally 
would provide the FTC consumer protection authority over all 
manner of transportation and telecommunications services.152 Such 
a reform would remove an important remaining vestige of the 
regulatory era by eliminating the DOT’s ability to prescribe 
regulations for the sale of air transportation and instead allowing 
the market to dictate consumer practices of airlines and ticket 
agents subject to the appropriate threat of FTC suit. 
Of course the political feasibility of this solution is suspect: it 
is doubtful that an agency or its congressional overseers willingly 
would give up regulatory authority over an industry as important as 
air travel.153 Indeed, the FTC has been asking for this reform for 
years to no avail.154 A narrower version of this reform—repeal of 
the FTC’s common carrier jurisdiction with respect to only 
airlines—may be more feasible. 
It should be noted that this reform was on the table in 1984 
when Congress was disbanding the CAB, but rejected largely 
because of the need for additional legislation, the FTC’s 
cumbersome rulemaking process, and a fear that the FTC would 
lack the requisite knowledge of the airline industry.155 Although 
Congress still would have to pass legislation, the FTC has gone 
                                                
 152 Such a reform may also be more attractive given the FCC’s recent Title II 
classification of consumer broadband service. 
 153 See Marisam, supra note 4, at 184–85. 
 154  See, e.g., Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on 
Consumer Privacy: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and 
Tech., 110th Cong. (2010) (statement of Jon Leibowitz, Charman of the Federal 
Trade Commission), See, e.g., http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ 
public_statements/prepared-statement-federal-trade-commission-consumer-
privacy/100727consumerprivacy.pdf. 
 155 See Marisam, supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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through a substantial overhaul in the last thirty years, which may 
allay some Congressional fears; in 1984, the FTC’s excesses of the 
1970s were probably fresh in the mind of Congress, but in the 
years since, the FTC has abandoned rulemaking and has blossomed 
into a responsible consumer protection enforcer with its harm-
based approach. Further, the FTC has proven itself adept at 
applying its consumer protection authority to all manner of 
industries. 
A second, more cautious approach would be to amend Section 
41712 to cover only airline practices not involving advertising or 
sales. At the same time, Congress could clarify that Section 5 of 
the FTC Act reaches ticket agents and ticket sales by airlines 
despite the common carrier exemption. For example, the DOT 
would be permitted to enforce or promulgate rules that concern 
things like baggage fees or tarmac delays, and the FTC would 
become the sole consumer protection enforcer in the sale of airline 
travel. Although it would still require congressional action, this 
solution would have the political advantage of asking for less 
reform and allowing DOT to retain some consumer protection 
jurisdiction over airlines. This scheme also has the advantage of 
freeing OTAs from having to deal with two separate regulatory 
standards. Further, it would vest each agency with authority over 
conduct that lies in their core competencies: airline practices with 
DOT, and consumer sales with FTC. 
A third, and even more cautious solution, would be merely to 
remove “ticket agents” from DOT’s consumer protection 
jurisdiction. The FTC already enjoys concurrent jurisdiction over 
these entities, so there would be no need to amend Section 5. The 
only legislative fix would be to amend Section 41712. What’s 
more, in theory DOT and FTC could accomplish this reform 
without legislative action: the agencies could enter into a 
memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) in which DOT promises 
to forebear from enforcing Section 41712 with respect to ticket 
agents or to consult with the FTC and give it the right of first 
refusal with respect to an action against ticket agents. Such an 
arrangement could be similar to the MOU between FTC and the 
CFPB with respect to consumer protection involving consumer 
financial products, which requires the FTC and CFPB to 
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coordinate enforcement and policymaking to avoid “duplication of 
efforts,” and “unnecessary burdens on businesses.”156 Of course, 
this solution would have the downside of creating two separate 
standards for online sales of air travel, one for the airlines’ site and 
another for OTAs. Nonetheless, it would be preferable to the 
current state of affairs that subjects OTAs to two separate 
consumer protection regulators. Further, to ameliorate any 
potential problems with two regulators for online air travel sales, 
Congress could require FTC and DOT to harmonize their policies. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Regulatory reform is something that every administration has 
strived for since the beginning of the regulatory state. Duplicative 
regulatory authority not only wastes taxpayer money by requiring 
two agencies to perform the same task, it risks compounding 
regulatory compliance costs by subjecting covered entities to 
potentially inconsistent rules. Duplicative FTC and DOT 
regulation in the sale of airline transportation stands to be 
especially costly. The current regulatory regime subjects OTAs to 
heavy-handed regulation from DOT for their sales of airline 
tickets, and FTC enforcement authority for the remainder of their 
portfolio. These costs will only go up as privacy and data security 
become increasingly more important to consumer protection issues 
and DOT continues to expand the reach of its regulatory 
requirements. Avoiding this redundancy requires selecting one 
agency to provide consumer protection oversight of OTA. Given 
its institutional expertise and the flexibility its harm-based 
enforcement provides, the FTC is the clear choice. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 156 See Federal Trade Commission, Memorandum of Understanding Between 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Federal Trade Commission 
at 2 (March 12, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/ 
cooperation_agreements/150312ftc-cfpb-mou.pdf. 
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